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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Oil prices have rebounded vigorously from their trough in early-2016 and are expected to 
stage a more moderate rally in the next two years (Figure 1). The WTI spot price declined 
close to $30 a barrel in February 2016 (monthly average data), losing nearly ¾ of its value 
since June 2014. However, by mid-May, they have rebounded by more than 50 percent. 
Pricing of futures contracts suggests that oil prices are expected to recover at a more 
measured pace, by 5-10 percent over the coming two years.  
Figure 1. WTI oil prices (U$ a barrel, monthly average) 
Sources: Haver and IMF staff calculations. 
Note: Actual through end-April 2016. Red broken line based on 3, 6, 12, 24 month futures prices, close of May 
12. 
 
Generally, the GCC economies can be adversely affected by low oil prices for at least two 
reasons: 
 First, the GCC economies are highly dependent on oil and gas exports. During 2011–14, 
hydrocarbon exports represented about 70 percent of exports of goods and services on 
average (Table 1). Fiscal dependence on hydrocarbon revenues was even greater, 
accounting for over 80 percent of total fiscal revenues on average. Over the past decade 
and a half, the dependence on hydrocarbon fiscal revenues did not decline despite efforts 
at economic diversification.  
 Second, macro-financial linkages in the GCC can amplify the effects of oil price 
movements over the financial cycle. Oil price movements and government spending 
policies create feedback loops between asset prices and credit that can lead to the buildup 
of systemic vulnerabilities in the financial sector. Oil price upturns lead to higher oil 
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revenues, and stronger fiscal and external positions. Equity market returns are larger as 
investors anticipate the impact of higher oil prices on the corporate sector, and generally 
stronger government spending growth. In turn, stronger government spending leads to 
higher non-oil output growth, greater banking sector liquidity and credit growth, higher 
real estate prices, and stronger bank balance sheets. Asset price appreciation also has 
positive wealth effects. In the event of an oil price downturn, these developments can 
reverse. With financial sectors being large in the GCC (Table 2), and oil prices being 
highly volatile, the unraveling of systemic financial sector vulnerabilities could have 
significant adverse effects on the real economy.  
 
 
 
As an important reminder, systemic financial sector risks rose in the GCC countries with the 
oil price upswing in the years before the global financial crisis. An expanding deposit base 
and high liquidity (owing to high oil prices and short-term capital inflows) resulted in credit 
and asset-price booms before the global financial crisis. Al-Hassan and others (2010) explain 
the role of short-term capital inflows and high oil prices in fueling financial sector 
vulnerabilities in the run up to the global financial crisis. Arvai and others (2014) also discuss 
the near doubling of private sector credit as a share of non-oil GDP in the GCC during 2003-
08 which contributed to systemic vulnerabilities. Bologna and Prasad (2010) document a 
sharp increase in household leverage between 2004 and 2008 in Oman. Al-Hassan and others 
(2010) suggest that the bursting of a domestic real estate bubble and tightening global 
liquidity conditions played a role in the United Arab Emirates’ 2009 financial crisis, while 
defaults in 2008 by two of the largest investment companies in Kuwait imposed strains on 
the banking system, with the third-largest bank having to be recapitalized. IMF (2010) 
discusses Qatar’s preemptive recapitalization of banks and other measures to support the 
banking sector in 2009. As the global financial crisis hit, asset prices and credit declined in 
several GCC countries, although fiscal stimulus and liquidity support helped cushion the 
impact.  
More generally, evidence suggests that oil price performance has been an important driver of 
business and financial variables in the GCC economies (Callen, Khandelwal, Miyajima, and 
Santos (2015)). First, stronger performance of real and financial variables tends to be 
associated with oil price upturns. For instance, during 1991–2014, the growth rates of real 
2000-05 2006-10 2011-14
Bahrain 58.7 60.5 65.1
Kuwait 82.7 80.5 87.6
Oman 76.9 69.4 64.3
Qatar 88.5 85.9 88.9
Saudi Arabia 83.4 83.1 83.0
United Arab Emirates 45.0 38.7 32.6
Bahrain 71.7 82.2 87.2
Kuwait 72.7 79.2 83.6
Oman 83.4 83.4 88.7
Qatar 90.5 88.3 90.7
Saudi Arabia 82.8 88.3 90.3
United Arab Emirates 60.2 65.1 69.9
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Oil export revenues as percent of total exports of goods and services
Table 1. GCC: Dependence on Oil Revenues
Fiscal oil revenues as percent of total fiscal revenues
Note: Fiscal data is of the general government for UAE and central government in other 
GCC countries
Bank Assets Market Capitalization
Bahrain 259.7 64.1
Kuwait 165.5 72.8
Oman 121.4 28.1
Qatar 148.7 73.7
Saudi Arabia 92.6 71.0
United Arab Emirates 193.4 59.7
Source: GCC authorities, Bloomberg 
Table 2. GCC: Size of the Financial System
Note: United Arab Emirates market capitalization is sum of Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai stock markets; Market capitalization data is as of Sept. 16, 2015. 
Banking sector data for Bahrain excludes wholesale banks.
(Percent of GDP)
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government spending and non-oil GDP were much stronger during oil price upturns than 
during downturns. Second, the timing of downturns in business and financial variables in 
some cases coincides with that of oil prices.  Contractions in credit and equity markets 
reflected oil price movements, along with global financial market developments and the 
underlying domestic vulnerabilities. Importantly, contractions in real government spending 
occurred as often as real oil price downturns in the 1990s, but less so since 2000, likely aided 
by greater fiscal buffers. 
Strong banking sector soundness provides an important buffer in the GCC to the oil price 
decline since mid-2014. GCC banks have strong capital and liquidity buffers as of end-2014. 
Capital buffers and provisioning levels were above those in many other commodity exporting 
countries. NPL ratios are low and both loan loss provisions and profits are strong. In fact, 
provisions fully cover NPLs, on average. Strong macroeconomic performance helped, so did 
strengthened regulatory frameworks and improved risk management. However, liquidity 
conditions have started to tighten more recently. While credit growth has remained robust, 
deposit growth has slowed, largely as governments and government-related entities have 
withdrawn deposits from the banking system (Figure 2). Interbank rates have edged higher 
since the beginning of the summer of 2015.  
Figure 2. Growth Rates of Bank Credit and Deposits in the GCC Countries 
(Year on year, percent) 
 
                Sources: Haver and IMF staff calculations. 
 
 
Against this backdrop, this paper addresses three interlinked issues: (i) how oil prices affect 
NPLs in the GCC; (ii) the links between oil prices and real and financial developments in 
these countries; and (iii) observed behavior of bank capital and provisioning with respect to 
indicators of the business and financial cycles. Section II reviews the literature. Section III 
discusses the strategy of modelling bank asset quality relying on a range of multivariate 
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approaches and of identifying oil-macro-financial linkages relying on a panel vector 
autoregression (VAR) approach. Section IV discusses the data used while Section V the 
empirical results. Section VI empirically assesses the observed behavior of bank capital and 
provisions with respect to indicators of business and financial cycles. Finally, Section VII 
provides concluding discussions.  
 
II.   LITERATURE 
Empirical studies on bank asset quality and macro-financial linkages have expanded to 
include those of the Middle East and North Africa region. In the area of asset quality 
assessment, Nkusu (2011) analyzes country-level data spanning 1998–2009 for 26 advanced 
economies and confirms that adverse macroeconomic developments are associated with 
rising NPLs. De Bock and Demyantes (2012) use country-level annual observations for 
25 emerging markets during 1996–2010 and find that the NPL ratio increases when 
economic growth declines, the exchange rate weakens, the terms of trade deteriorate and 
debt-creating capital inflows decline. Klein (2013) uses data spanning 1998–2011 for the ten 
largest banks in 16 countries (thus a total of 160 banks) in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe and finds that macroeconomic conditions are relatively more important than banks 
specific factors in explaining NPLs.  
 
Espinoza and Prasad (2010) represent the first attempt to model NPLs in the GCC countries 
using both macroeconomic and bank-level data. Using data spanning 1995–2008 for about 
80 banks in the GCC region, the authors find that the NPL ratio rises as economic growth 
declines and both interest rates and risk aversion increase. Love and Ariss (2014) analyze a 
panel of Egyptian banks over 1993–2010 and find that larger capital inflows and stronger 
GDP growth improve bank loan portfolio quality. Many of the studies, but not all, also 
investigate macro-financial linkages. Earlier work relies on macro-level data (Nkusu (2011), 
De Bock and Demyantes (2012), Klein (2013), Vazquez et al (2012)). Espinosa and Prasad 
(2010) study the GCC economies and find a strong, albeit short-lived feedback effect from 
weaker bank balance sheet conditions to economic activity. Studies applying a panel VAR 
approach to bank-level data are emerging. Recent studies focusing on the Middle East and 
North Africa include Love and Ariss (2014) for Egypt and Miyajima (2016) for Saudi 
Arabia.  
III.   ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES 
This section discusses two related empirical models of oil-macro-financial linkages - a 
multivariate model of NPL ratios and a panel VAR model – for the GCC economies. 
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A.    A multivariate model of NPL ratios 
A multivariate model is used to empirically assess the determinants of NPLs in the GCC. As 
is common in the literature, the dependent variable, the bank-level NPL ratio, was used after 
a logit transformation – this makes the NPL ratio a more normally-distributed variable and 
captures the empirical regularity that the variable tends to vary most for banks that start out 
with higher starting levels (Figure 3). A range of explanatory variables was considered, 
guided by the discussion in the earlier part of the paper (Real US fed funds rate is de-trended 
as unitroot tests suggest the variable is not stationary).  
 
Figure 3. Distribution of NPL Ratios in GCC 
 
Sources: Bankscope and authors' calculation. 
 
Dummy variables are introduced to help control for potential country effects as well as time 
effects not directly related to oil price shocks. As discussed earlier, many of the GCC 
countries experienced such stress events.  
The determinants of the NPL ratio are estimated using the following multivariate panel data 
specification for bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡ே௉௅௥೔೟ = 𝛼ଵ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡ே௉௅௥௜,௧ିଵ + ෍ 𝛼ଶ௝𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙௝,௧ିଵ௝
෍ 𝛼ଷ௞𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜௞,௧ିଵ
௞
+ ෍ 𝛼ସ𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘௟,௜,௧ିଵ
௟
+ 𝛼ହ,௧𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦௧ + 𝛼଺,௠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦௠
+ 𝜃௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ 
(1) 
where 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡_𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟௜௧ is the logit transformation of the ratio of nonperforming loaks to total 
loans and the lagged regressor  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡_𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟௜,௧ିଵ captures its persistence commonly found in 
the literature. 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙௝,௧ିଵ (j =1) is the real US Fed funds rate. 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜௞,௧ିଵ represents 
macroeconomic variables (𝑘 = 1, 2, 3) – real growth rates of oil prices, nonoil private sector 
GDP, and equity prices, lagged by one period. NPL ratios are expected to rise as US interest 
rates rise and the value of the macro variables declines. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘௟,௜,௧ିଵ is real credit growth (𝑙 =
1) lagged by one period. Positive and healthy credit growth would help support economic 
activity and lead to lower NPL ratios. That being said, in the medium term, higher leverage 
in the economy could build vulnerabilities. Year and country dummy variables are 
introduced in the regressions to control for events other than oil price developments that 
potentially led to an increase in NPL ratios and potential country effects. 𝜃௜ and 𝜀௜,௧ are bank 
fixed effects and random errors. 
 
Two alternative dynamic panel models were used to check the robustness of the baseline 
estimates – Fixed Effects (FE) and Least Squares Dummy Variable Correction (LSDVC) 
(Kiviet, 1995; Bruno, 2005). The fixed effects model incorporates the data’s panel structure 
but ignores the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the regression error, 
thus yielding a downward-biased coefficient estimates for the lagged dependent variable. 
LSDVC corrects the biased in fixed effects-estimated coefficients, assuming that the 
independent variables are exogenous (The Anderson and Hsiao approach is used). The 
lagged dependent variable should lie between OLS and FE. The combination of fixed effects 
and lagged dependent variables can introduce econometric bias. In particular, OLS estimates 
of the lagged dependent variable’s coefficient in a dynamic panel model are biased due to the 
correlation between the fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable (Nickell (1981)). 
Such bias declines as panel length increases. Moreover, data property can affect different 
estimators’ performance (Flannery et al, 2013). 
 
B.   A panel VAR model of oil-macro-financial linkages 
To identify a positive feedback loop between the macroeconomic and bank-level balance 
sheet variables, a panel vector autoregression (VAR) model, which accounts for bank-level 
heterogeneity, was estimated. The multivariate model in the previous section considered the 
uni-directional effects of macroeconomic shocks on the bank NPL ratio. A panel VAR model 
employed in this section goes one step further and captures the spillback from the bank NPL 
ratio and other balance sheet variables to the macroeconomy. 
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𝑦௜,௧ = 𝐵଴ + 𝐵ଵ(𝐿)𝑦௜,௧ + 𝑢௜,௧ (2) 
where 𝑦௜,௧ is a vector of macroeconomic and bank-level variables, 𝐵଴ is the deterministic 
component, (𝐿) is a lag operator and 𝑢௜,௧ is the residual. The model was estimated using a 
panel VAR routine pvar developed by Love and Zicchino (2006), which exploits a System-
General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator as in Arellano and Bover (1995). As the 
fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to lags of the dependent variables, the 
mean-differencing procedure commonly used to eliminate fixed effects would create biased 
coefficients. The orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors is 
preserved by forward mean-differencing (the Helmert procedure in Arellano and Bover, 
1995), which removes the mean of the future observations. Then, lagged regressors are used 
as instruments to estimate the coefficients by system GMM. The number of lags is set at two 
in view of the short time series dimension of the data discussed later (2000–14). 
Five macroeconomic and bank level variables were included: macroeconomic variables 
include real oil price growth and real equity price growth; bank level variables are NPL 
ratios, real credit growth and real deposit growth for 42 GCC banks for which sufficient time 
series data are available.  
The identification of shocks is based on a Cholesky decomposition where the variables are 
stacked to explore how macroeconomic shocks affect bank-level variables first, and how the 
latter affect the former in the second round. In particular, macroeconomic variables {real oil 
price growth} are stacked at the top. The bank-level variables {NPL ratio, real credit growth, 
real deposit growth} are stacked below the macro-level variables. Finally, real equity price 
growth is stacked at the bottom as commonly done in the literature.  
IV.   DATA 
Our empirical analyses rely on macroeconomic and bank-level data which cover the six GCC 
economies and span 1999–2014 (Figure 3). 
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Figure 4. Macroeconomic and Bank Level Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Bankscope, Haver, and authors’ calculations. 
Note: The green bands represent a 50 percent range around the median value. Real values except 
for the NPL ratio.   
 
The macroeconomic and financial sector variables included are real oil price growth, nonoil 
private sector real GDP growth, real equity price growth, and US interest rates. Real oil price 
growth averaged 17 percent year-on-year during 1999-2011 despite having declined sharply 
in 2001 and 2009. More recently, it fell increasingly into negative territory, reaching close to 
-10 percent in 2014. Nonoil private sector real GDP growth jumped in 2004, from around 
4 percent year on year on average during the preceding several years to near 20 percent and, 
despite decelerating, remained above 10 percent through 2008. However, as lower oil prices 
took their toll on economic activity, the variable’s performance fell to below 6 percent in 
2014. Stock returns were impressive during the earlier part of the sample period on strong oil 
price performance. The strong stock price performance may partly reflect the pent-up 
demand from domestic investors to help diversify their asset allocation after some of the 
stock markets were established in the early 2000s. Real equity price growth was close to an 
average of 40 percent every year during 2001–05. Data on real estate prices are unavailable 
for GCC countries. However, following a sharp 40 percent drop in 2009, real stocks returns 
have been more subdued, registering an average of 3 percent decline per year during 2009–
15. The U.S. Fed funds rate went through several cycles during the period. After increasing 
through 2000, it declined sharply in 2001. It rose during 2004–06, and declined sharply in 
2008 and remained unchanged through 2014.  
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Table 3. Sampled GCC Banks  
 
                      Sources: Bankscope and authors' calculations. 
                      Note: Percent share measured in terms of the stock of domestic credit. 
 
The bank-level variables include NPLs as a share of total loans (the NPL ratio), real credit 
growth, and real deposit growth. The analysis incorporates 42 GCC banks for which 
sufficient time series data are available from Bankscope (Tables 3 and A1). These banks 
represent on average some 70 percent of the individual banking system in terms of the stock 
of credit. In terms of broad trends, the NPL ratio broadly declined during the sample period, 
at an accelerating pace during the first half of the 2000s when the oil price strengthened 
noticeably. The NPL ratio increased in 2009 coinciding with a sharp oil price decline, but 
due likely also to the realization of domestic vulnerabilities that had built up during the run 
up to the global financial crisis. The growth rates of credit and deposits appear to broadly 
mirror movements of oil prices, economic activity and equity prices. The results suggest that 
some of the macroeconomic and bank level variables are key determinants of NPL ratios in 
GCC (Table 4). A number of models were estimated using a system GMM approach. Models 
7-12 pass certain statistical tests (Hansen, AR(1) and AR(2)). The NPL ratio exhibits strong 
persistence. Growth rates of real oil prices and nonoil private sector GDP are significant, 
suggesting that an increase in oil prices or private sector output leads to a decline in the NPL 
ratio. The coefficients on real equity prices growth and real credit growth come out with the 
correct sign but are not statistically significant. Real government spending and real U.S. 
interest rates do not directly affect NPL ratios in a systematic way (real government spending 
not shown).  
 
Table 4. Determinants of Bank NPL Ratios in the GCC: System GMM results 
Number of banks Percent share
Bahrain 4 44                                           
Kuwait 5 60                                           
Oman 6 83                                           
Qatar 7 81                                           
Saudi Arabia 9 77                                           
United Arab Emirates 11 62                                           
Average 7 68
Total 42 …
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The results are subject to some caveats. First, the information content of publicly available 
bank-level balance sheet data is relatively limited compared with the more granular 
regulatory data typically used for some other IMF assessments (such as FSAP). Second, any 
analysis based on historical data might not always account for the effects of recent 
improvements to risk-management and supervisory frameworks. Third, the data spanning 
2000–14 may not capture a sufficient number of oil price and financial cycles. Fourth, as 
inherent in any econometric analysis, there is parameter uncertainty surrounding the 
estimated relationship between macroeconomic shocks and NPL ratios.  
 
The empirical results imply that the actual and projected declines in oil prices and slowing of 
GDP growth could lead to an increase in the NPL ratio (Figure 5). For illustrative purposes, 
the NPL ratios in 10, 50 and 90 percentiles in 2014 are taken as starting points to which the 
coefficients obtained from model 8 are applied. Data on actual and projected oil price 
performance for 2015–20 (see Figure 1) suggest that oil prices will, on average, remain 
50-60 percent below the 2014 peak in the medium term. Recognizing the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the oil price projections and that the risks are tilted to the upside, 
for this simulation, oil prices are assumed to decline by 50 percent in t = 0, and remain 
unchanged for three years. Similarly, non-oil GDP growth is assumed to weaken by 
3 percentage points. Figure 5 shows that, starting from 0.8 percent, the NPL ratio would rise 
by 1 percentage point to 1.9 percent in three years. Banks with lower asset quality would 
witness larger increases. Starting from 2.5 (8.5) percent, the NPL ratio would rise by about 
Model number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Logit of NPL ratio (L1) 0.932*** 0.923*** 0.941*** 0.714*** 0.716*** 0.806*** 0.872*** 0.842*** 0.874*** 0.620* 0.649* 0.775***
0.231 0.219 0.181 0.159 0.16 0.14 0.156 0.122 0.082 0.352 0.365 0.227
Real oil price growth (L1) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.012* -0.008* -0.008*** -0.020* -0.015 -0.013
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.011 0.01 0.01
nonoil GDP growth (L1) 0.01 0.001 0.006 -0.055* -0.059** -0.037 -0.058 -0.076* -0.069* -0.276 -0.234 -0.155
0.038 0.036 0.032 0.03 0.029 0.024 0.054 0.046 0.036 0.251 0.261 0.192
Real equity price growth (L1) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005* -0.003 -0.012 -0.001 -0.003 -0.012 -0.003 -0.005
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.017 0.012 0.006 0.017 0.013 0.009
Real credit growth (L1) -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 0 0.001 0 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002
0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.003
Real US fed funds FD (L1) 0.084 0.065 0.086 0.031 0.015 0.08 … … … … … …
0.12 0.11 0.087 0.096 0.092 0.083 … … … … … …
Constant -0.194 -0.18 -0.167 -0.484 -0.458 -0.309 0.348 0.427** 0.478** 0.646 0.661 0.6
0.565 0.529 0.445 0.441 0.442 0.408 0.31 0.216 0.199 0.7 0.533 0.365
Year dummy N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country dummy N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y
Lag depth 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
p-values
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.014 0.002
AR(2) 0.206 0.196 0.141 0.103 0.103 0.096 0.364 0.192 0.251 0.144 0.180 0.204
Hansen 0.002 0.012 0.030 0.005 0.026 0.100 0.546 0.634 0.790 0.946 0.850 0.802
Passes tests? N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sources: Bankscope, Haver, Bloomberg, and staff estimates.
Note: The dependent variable is bank-by-bank (logit transformed) NPL ratio for selected GCC banks spanning 2000-2014 (annual frequency). Relying on a 
system GMM approach, with the collapsing method. The coefficients represent non-liner effect that depends on starting levels.  Sandard errors estimated 
using the Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***, **, and * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. L1 signifies one period lag. AR(1) and 
AR(2) signify p-values associated with the null hypothesis of lack of first and second order serial correlation. Hansen signifies p-value associated with the 
null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous. A model is cosidered to pass tests if pvalues of both AR(2) and Hansen tests are 10% or greater.
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3 (10) percentage points to about 6 (19) percent. Nevertheless, their strong capital buffers, 
profitability, and provisions provide an important source of resilience for GCC banks.    
 
Figure 5 Dynamics of NPL Ratios After a 50 Percent Decline in Oil Prices and 3 
Percentage Point Reduction in Nonoil GDP Growth in t=0 
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Source: Bankscope, Haver, and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The three cases illustrate banks in the 10th, 50th, and 90th
percentile of NPLS in 2014 and the impact of an adverse oil price 
and growth shock scenario over a three year horizon.
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Table 5. Determinants of Bank NPL Ratios in the GCC-Alternative Approaches 
 
 
Robustness checks 
 
The results using alternative approaches support the key findings of our baseline analysis 
(Table 5). The NPL ratio exhibits similar levels of persistence. The coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variable are in a range of 0.68–0.69 based on the fixed effects model (models 13–
17), below 0.68–0.86 estimated using LSDVC (models 18–22). A lower autoregressive 
coefficient generates a steeper path of a projected NPL ratio in a downside scenario analysis. 
Growth rates of real oil prices, nonoil private sector GDP and real equity prices remain key 
determinants of NPL ratios in the GCC economies. The coefficients on real credit growth 
come out with the correct sign but are not statistically significant. Real government spending 
(not shown) and real U.S. interest rates do not directly affect NPL ratios in a systematic way. 
 
A.   A panel VAR model of oil-macro-financial linkages 
The estimated results are summarized as follows. Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients 
from the system GMM approach in the panel VAR model. The estimated coefficients are 
often statistically significant. Table 7 includes impulse response values after normalizing by 
the size of each variable’s one standard deviation shock. Figure 6 displays the values 
visually. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model number 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Logit of NPL ratio (L1) 0.686*** 0.681*** 0.694*** 0.685*** 0.688*** 0.686*** 0.681*** 0.783*** 0.762*** 0.869***
0.034 0.038 0.039 0.043 0.036 0.054 0.05 0.058 0.057 0.039
Real oil price growth (L1) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.019*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.016 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.001
nonoil GDP growth (L1) -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.023** -0.023** -0.009 -0.034 -0.03 -0.021*** -0.021** -0.004
0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.137 0.088 0.008 0.01 0.01
Real equity price growth (L1) … -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001 … -0.002 -0.002** -0.002* 0
… 0 0 0 0.001 … 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.001
Real credit growth (L1) … … -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 … … -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*
… … 0.002 0.002 0.002 … … 0.001 0.002 0.002
Real US fed funds FD (L1) … … … -0.023 … … … … -0.019 …
… … … 0.018 … … … … 0.034 …
Year dummy N N N N Y N N N N Y
N 575 551 499 499 499 575 551 499 499 499
Overall R^2 0.725 0.719 0.724 0.723 0.762 0.724 0.719 0.726 0.725 0.768
Sources: Bankscope, Haver, Bloomberg, and staff estimates.
Note: The dependent variable is bank-by-bank (logit transformed) NPL ratio for selected GCC banks spanning 2000-2014 (annual frequency). LSDVC = a bias 
corrected least squares dummy variable estaimtor (Anderson-Hsiao). The coefficients represent non-liner effect that depends on starting levels. Sandard 
errors estimated using the Huber-White sandwich estimators. ***, **, and * signify significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. L1 signifies one period lag. 
Fixed effects LSDVC
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Table 6. GCC: Estimated Panel VAR Coefficients and T-Statistics  
Sources: Bankscope, Haver, and IMF staff calculations. 
Note: Estimated using a panel VAR routine with two lags. Annual data spanning 2000-14. Bank level data 
for NPL ratio, real credit and deposit growth for 42 GCC banks. “L.” and “L.2” are lag operator indicating 
the first and second lag. roilpg is real oil price growth, nplr is NPL to total loans ratio, rcrg real credit growth, 
rdpg is real deposit growth, reqpg is real equity price growth. 
There is strong empirical evidence of feedback loops between oil price movements, bank 
balance sheets, and asset prices in the GCC (Figure 6). Results from a panel VAR model 
suggest that, first, oil price movements affect bank balance sheets in a significant way. A 
drop in the growth rate of oil prices results in a rise in the ratio of nonperforming loans 
(NPL) to gross loans, and a reduction in the real growth rates of bank credit and deposits 
(Figure 1). A 1 percent decline in oil prices leads to a 0.2–0.3 percentage point decline in real 
credit growth and a 0.1–0.2 percentage point decline in real deposit growth—with timing 
varying from immediate to 2–3 year lags. The NPL ratio would increase by about 
0.1 percentage point in the long run. There is also a feedback effect within bank balance 
sheets, as a higher NPL ratio leads to lower real bank credit and deposit growth—as solvency 
risk rises, banks reduce lending to boost capital adequacy ratios, while the customers lose 
confidence in the banks, and vice versa. These results are consistent with other studies on the 
GCC economies (see, for instance, Espinoza and Prasad, 2010).  Schiozer and Oliveira 
(2015) find that during times of high systemic uncertainty, liquidity shocks have asymmetric 
effects on loan supply. That is, loan supply declines as liquidity falls. However, loan supply 
does not increase much when liquidity increases because banks tend to hold on to liquidity. 
 
coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat.
L.roilpg -0.006 -0.078 0.007 0.860 0.070 1.883 0.083 1.894 -0.580 -8.010
L.nplr 1.938 3.149 0.880 6.169 -0.281 -1.034 -0.583 -1.823 0.453 0.668
L.rcrg 0.049 0.496 0.001 0.082 0.045 0.559 -0.012 -0.148 0.343 2.276
L.rdpg 0.241 2.395 -0.030 -3.728 0.328 3.782 0.241 2.754 0.084 0.573
L.reqpg -0.020 -0.632 -0.003 -0.894 0.004 0.132 -0.023 -0.846 0.377 5.238
L2.roilpg 0.063 1.150 0.003 0.583 0.061 1.769 0.031 0.851 -0.040 -0.603
L2.nplr 0.374 0.956 -0.223 -2.423 0.859 2.925 0.884 3.140 1.738 2.834
L2.rcrg 0.199 2.374 0.006 0.720 0.099 1.461 0.041 0.457 0.207 1.271
L2.rdpg 0.011 0.139 0.019 2.185 -0.007 -0.108 0.036 0.385 -0.259 -2.180
L2.reqpg 0.011 0.363 -0.011 -3.355 0.066 2.517 0.084 3.406 -0.014 -0.284
nplrroilpg reqpgrdpgrcrg
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Table 7. GCC: Response of Macro and Bank Level Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Source: IMF staff calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
time roilpg nplr rcrg rdpg reqpg
0 roilpg 22.241 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 roilpg -0.240 3.784 2.219 2.907 -0.538
2 roilpg 2.611 4.001 2.728 0.277 -0.189
3 roilpg 0.697 3.393 1.013 1.059 -0.197
4 roilpg 0.686 2.662 0.856 0.367 -0.393
5 roilpg 0.330 1.938 0.461 0.376 -0.475
6 roilpg 0.327 1.338 0.306 0.261 -0.454
0 nplr -0.517 2.242 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 nplr -0.456 2.037 -0.221 -0.378 -0.075
2 nplr -0.365 1.331 -0.102 -0.204 -0.366
3 nplr -0.171 0.692 -0.116 -0.074 -0.492
4 nplr 0.032 0.288 -0.093 0.040 -0.393
5 nplr 0.109 0.078 -0.043 0.094 -0.249
6 nplr 0.120 -0.003 0.002 0.096 -0.128
0 rcrg 5.824 -1.161 13.562 0.000 0.000
1 rcrg 3.327 -1.372 2.918 4.041 0.100
2 rcrg 3.737 0.858 2.548 1.554 1.569
3 rcrg 1.067 2.017 1.666 1.082 1.351
4 rcrg 0.399 2.254 1.158 0.212 0.668
5 rcrg -0.004 1.970 0.576 0.062 0.138
6 rcrg -0.028 1.484 0.278 -0.005 -0.184
0 rdpg 3.967 -2.105 6.978 12.285 0.000
1 rdpg 2.632 -1.797 1.368 2.898 -0.610
2 rdpg 3.038 0.546 1.789 1.748 1.842
3 rdpg 0.635 1.450 1.296 0.812 1.274
4 rdpg 0.178 1.696 0.898 0.075 0.625
5 rdpg -0.094 1.494 0.408 -0.017 0.155
6 rdpg -0.082 1.120 0.180 -0.052 -0.127
0 reqpg 17.497 -0.159 6.447 2.852 26.333
1 reqpg -4.211 0.383 7.658 2.101 9.920
2 reqpg -2.158 2.459 3.519 -2.665 3.635
3 reqpg -1.677 3.115 0.390 -1.298 1.938
4 reqpg -1.421 2.486 -0.086 -1.157 0.359
5 reqpg -1.013 1.501 -0.340 -0.692 -0.460
6 reqpg -0.449 0.662 -0.372 -0.322 -0.647
(Responses)
(Shock variable)
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Second, equity price developments are a channel for amplification of the bank liquidity 
feedback loop stemming from an adverse oil price shock. A one percent reduction in oil price 
growth leads to a 0.8 percent decline in the rate of equity price inflation, which in turn leads 
to a reduction of bank credit and deposit growth by 0.1 percentage point, further depressing 
equity price performance.  
One counter-intuitive result is that a lower NPL ratio leads to lower equity prices. The 
transmission in the opposite direction is consistent with the prior. That is, higher equity 
prices lead to a lower NPL ratio. However, the counter-intuitive outcome broadly disappears 
when the number of lag is increased from two to three (Figure A1). 
Figure 6. GCC: Response of Macro and Bank Level Variables -  two lags 
 
 
Sources: Bankscope, Haver, and IMF staff calculations. 
Note: Estimated using a panel VAR routine with two lags. Annual data spanning 2000–14. Bank level data for 
NPL ratio, real credit and deposit growth for 42 GCC banks, roilpg is real oil price growth, nplr is NPL to total 
loans ratio, rcrg real credit growth, rdpg is real deposit growth, reqpg is real equity price growth. 
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V.   MOVEMENTS IN BANK CAPITAL AND PROVISIONS IN THE GCC 
The existence of oil-macro-financial feedback loops suggests greater needs to build buffers in 
good times in the GCC. The importance of building buffers to cushion against negative 
shocks has been well documented. Increasing capital and provisions in good times helps 
enhance the resilience of the financial system and reduce procyclical feedback effects 
between asset prices and credit. In Saudi Arabia, empirical evidence confirms the view that 
bank capital and provisioning buffers have been moved counter-cyclically (Abusaaq et al, 
2015). Both the capital and provisioning ratios increase as indicators of business and 
financial cycles strengthen.  
 
Table 8. Correlation of NPL Provisions and Capital Ratios with Indicators of Business and 
Financial Cycles: Country Level Analysis 
(Correlation and p-values) 
Sources: Bankscope and IMF staff estimates. 
Note: ***, **, and * signify statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level. 
 
A simple empirical approach is used to shed light on the countercyclical behavior of loan loss 
provisions and capital ratios in the GCC. Developments in loan loss provisioning and capital 
adequacy ratios (CAR) are compared to movements in key business and financial cycle 
indicators, including the credit-to-nonoil GDP gap (estimated as percent deviations from HP 
trends), real credit growth, and real nonoil GDP growth. The “credit to nonoil GDP gap”, 
defined here as the deviation in the ratio of credit to non-oil GDP from its long run trend, is a 
key indicator of the financial cycle, but should be complemented by additional indicators and 
Credit to non oil GDP gap Real credit growth Real non oil GDP growth Real oil price growth
Bahrain Provisions/NPL Coeff. 0.07 0.62 *** 0.21 0.29
p-val. 0.80 0.02 0.46 0.31
CAR Coeff. -0.82 *** 0.45 *** 0.73 *** 0.57 ***
p-val. 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.03
Kuwait Provisions/NPL Coeff. -0.74 *** 0.57 *** 0.45 0.28
p-val. 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.32
CAR Coeff. -0.34 0.63 *** 0.43 -0.16
p-val. 0.22 0.01 0.12 0.59
Oman Provisions/NPL Coeff. 0.51 *** 0.28 -0.11 -0.22
p-val. 0.06 0.33 0.70 0.45
CAR Coeff. -0.90 *** 0.30 0.63 *** 0.49 ***
p-val. 0.00 0.29 0.01 0.07
Qatar Provisions/NPL Coeff. -0.46 *** 0.35 -0.09 0.34
p-val. 0.10 0.21 0.76 0.23
CAR Coeff. -0.77 *** 0.25 0.29 0.31
p-val. 0.00 0.46 0.39 0.34
Saudi Arabia Provisions/NPL Coeff. 0.69 *** 0.09 0.35 -0.09
p-val. 0.01 0.76 0.22 0.75
CAR Coeff. -0.04 0.30 0.03 0.14
p-val. 0.88 0.30 0.91 0.63
UAE Provisions/NPL Coeff. 0.51 *** 0.28 -0.11 -0.22
p-val. 0.06 0.33 0.70 0.45
CAR Coeff. -0.62 *** -0.44 0.21 0.12
p-val. 0.02 0.11 0.46 0.68
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judgment. It replaces the credit-to-GDP gap which is influenced by oil prices and does not 
provide a robust indicator of financial sector vulnerabilities in the GCC. The empirical 
literature finds that, currently, it is the single best early-warning indicator of crises, signaling 
crises five to three years in advance. To help address the well-known end-point issues with 
HP filters, the gaps for 2000–14 are calculated with two extra years of data, including 
forecasts through 2015–16. A two-sided approach is used. To account for GCC-specific 
factors, real oil price growth is also considered. The degree of countercyclical movement is 
assessed using correlation coefficients between provisions to NPLs or CAR with each of the 
four business and financial cycle indicators. The latter are lagged by one period (i.e. one 
year) to help reduce the chance of capturing reverse causality stemming from macro 
variables. Positive correlation coefficients, when statistically significant, signal the potential 
that provisions to NPLs and CAR are countercyclical – these ratios increase during good 
times. This exercise was conducted using country level data and bank level data. 
Table 9. Correlation of NPL Provisions and Capital Ratios with Indicators of Business and 
Financial Cycles: Bank level analysis 
(Number of banks with statistically significant positive correlation) 
 
Sources: Bankscope and IMF staff estimates. 
Note: The total number of banks analyzed is seven for both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, respectively.  
 
There is tentative evidence to suggest these tools have moved countercyclically for some 
GCC banks (Table 8). Country-level loan loss provisions to NPL ratios are calculated using 
bank level data from Bankscope. Bankscope-based country aggregates are consistent with 
IMF desk data and, importantly, available with longer time series. The sampled banks 
represent 50–96 percent (an average of 67 percent) of domestic banking systems measured in 
terms of percent of the stock of credit. This ratio is countercyclical relative to the credit to 
nonoil GDP gap in Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; and relative to real 
credit growth in Bahrain and Kuwait. Country-level CARs are assessed based on published 
country-level financial soundness indicators data. They are countercyclical in Bahrain, 
Kuwait, and Oman with respect to real growth of credit, nonoil GDP, or oil prices. No 
systematic linkage was found for Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In four 
instances either provisions to NPL ratios or CARs are found to be procyclical. The results 
need to be interpreted with caution as the annual data provide a relatively limited number of 
observations. Additionally, the estimated credit-to-nonoil GDP gap may not represent 
sufficiently the financial cycle.  
Credit to non oil GDP gap Real credit growth Real non oil GDP growth Real oil price growth
Saudi Arabia Provisions/NPL 7 1 1 2
CAR 4 2 2 0
United Arab Emirates Provisions/NPL 3 3 3 0
CAR 0 2 2 0
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Similar assessments using bank-level data reveal heterogeneity across individual banks. 
Given the relatively large sample size, a bank level analysis focuses on banks in Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates. Table 9 reports the number of banks with statistically 
significant positive correlation is reported. In Saudi Arabia, provisions to NPLs ratios are 
countercyclical, in a statistically significant way with respect to the credit-to-nonoil GDP gap 
for 7 of the 11 banks, consistent with the evidence based on the aggregate data. The CAR is 
countercyclical with respect to the credit to nonoil GDP gap for 4 banks. In the United Arab 
Emirates, provisions to NPL ratios are countercyclical with respect to most macroeconomic 
variables for 3 out of 7 banks. The CAR is countercyclical with respect to real growth rates 
of credit and nonoil GDP for 2 of the 7 banks analyzed.  
VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The paper demonstrates the existence of oil-macro-financial linkages in the GCC countries 
using various quantitative approaches. Generally speaking,  the performance of key 
indicators of business and financial cycles has generally strengthened during oil price 
upturns. The timing of downturns in those variables has tended to coincide with oil price 
downturns, even though greater fiscal buffers attenuated the linkage.  
These qualitative conclusions are confirmed with quantitative analyses, which were 
conducted relying on macroeconomic and bank-level data which cover the six GCC 
economies and span 1999–2014, and two related econometric approaches. The first set of 
empirical results, using multivariate econometric models, confirmed that oil prices and 
economic activity tended to significantly affect bank asset quality, and suggested that the 
actual and projected declines in oil prices and slowing of GDP growth could lead to an 
increase in the NPL ratio. The second set of empirical results using a panel VAR approach 
identified feedback loops between oil price movements, bank balance sheets, and asset prices 
in the GCC. A lower growth rate of oil prices would lead to a rise in the ratio of NPLs to 
gross loans, and a reduction in the real growth rates of bank credit and deposits. There was 
also a feedback effect within bank balance sheets, as a higher NPL ratio would lead to lower 
real bank credit and deposit growth. Equity price performance tended to work as a channel 
for amplification of the bank liquidity feedback loop stemming from an adverse oil price 
shock.  
In the presence of such oil-macro-financial feedback loops, tentative evidence suggested that 
banks in the GCC countries tended to set the capital ratio and provisioning for NPLs 
countercyclically. A simple empirical analysis, using both country- and bank-level data, 
revealed that loan loss provisions and capital adequacy ratios were positively correlated with 
indicators of business and financial cycles. In other words, these banks would build up 
buffers during good times and release them during difficult times. This helped strengthen the 
resilience of the financial system in the GCC to the oil price decline since mid-2014.  
The exposure of the GCC economies and financial sectors to volatile oil prices suggests an 
important role for countercyclical macroprudential policies to mitigate systemic risks 
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(Callen, Khandelwal, Miyajima, and Santos, 2015). The GCC countries are already 
implementing a wide range of macroprudential instruments to build resilience in the banking 
sector. Well-defined macroprudential policy frameworks should help guide the 
countercyclical use of macro-prudential policy tools in the GCC.  
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Annex 1. Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table A1. GCC Banks Included Econometric Analyses 
 
Country Bank
Bahrain 1 Ahli United Bank BSC
2 Gulf International Bank BSC
3 BBK B.S.C.
4 National Bank of Bahrain
Kuwait 5 National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K.
6 Kuwait Finance House
7 Gulf Bank KSC (The)
8 Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK (The)
9 Industrial Bank of Kuwait K.S.C.
Oman 10 Bank Muscat SAOG
11 Bank Dhofar SAOG
12 National Bank of Oman (SAOG)
13 HSBC Bank Oman
14 Oman Arab Bank SAOC
15 Ahli Bank SAOG
Qatar 16 Qatar National Bank
17 Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) QSC
18 Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ
19 Doha Bank
20 Ahli Bank QSC
21 International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C.
22 Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C.
Saudi Arabia 23 National Commercial Bank (The)
24 Samba Financial Group
25 Riyad Bank
26 Banque Saudi Fransi JSC
27 Saudi British Bank JSC (The)
28 Arab National Bank Public Joint Stock Company
29 Saudi Hollandi Bank
30 Saudi Investment Bank (The)
31 Bank AlJazira JSC
United Arab Emirates 32 National Bank of Abu Dhabi
33 First Gulf Bank
34 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank
35 Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co.
36 Mashreqbank PSC
37 Union National Bank
38 Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C.
39 Bank of Sharjah
40 National Bank of Fujairah PJSC
41 Commercial Bank International P.S.C.
42 National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC
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Figure A1. GCC: Response of Macro and Bank Level Variables – three lags 
 
 
 
Sources: Bankscope, Haver, and IMF staff calculations. 
 
Note: Estimated using a panel VAR routine with three lags. Annual data spanning 2000–14. Bank level data 
for NPL ratio, real credit and deposit growth for 42 GCC banks, roilpg is real oil price growth, nplr is NPL 
to total loans ratio, rcrg real credit growth, rdpg is real deposit growth, reqpg is real equity price growth. 
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